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DELEGATION, TIME, AND CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY: A RESPONSE TO
ADLER AND WALKER
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
Abstract
This is a response to an article by Jonathan Adler and Chris Walker. In Delegation and Time, Adler and
Walker introduce an important new way of thinking about broad congressional delegations of power.
After reviewing the traditional arguments against broad congressional delegations of power they note
that broad delegations increasingly raise a serious temporal problem.
In their words, “broad congressional delegations of authority at one time period become a source of
authority for agencies to take action at a later time that was wholly unanticipated by the enacting
Congress or could no longer receive legislative support.” They also note that this temporal problem “has
taken on added significance in the current era of congressional inaction.” Adler and Walker illustrate this
temporal problem well by referring to the efforts of the Federal Communications Commission to use the
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the internet and the efforts of the Environmental Protection
Administration to use the Clean Air Act of 1972 to mitigate climate change.
I agree with the concerns that Adler and Walker express. I would expand them to include broad
congressional delegations of power to the president that are being applied in ways that Congress never
contemplated and would not support today. President Trump’s use of the broad authority granted the
president in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and his use of the broad authority granted the president
under the National Emergencies Act of 1976 and over one hundred other “emergency” statutes illustrate
Adler and Walker’s temporal concerns particularly well.
President Trump has relied on the Trade Expansion Act as the basis for his imposition of massive tariffs as
part of his trade war against many of our trading partners. He has relied on the Emergencies Act to
reallocate funds from other uses to construction of the border wall that Congress has consistently refused
to fund. Both of those congressional grants of power have no apparent limit.
The Supreme Court recently rejected challenges to the validity of President Trump’s use of both of those
powers. Immediately after the Court refused to consider a challenge to the president’s use of the
Emergencies Act to fund the border wall, one of the Democratic candidates for president announced that,
if elected, he would invoke the Emergencies Act as the basis for spending trillions of dollars and imposing
draconian limits on the use of cars and trucks in an effort to mitigate climate change. President Trump
responded to the apparent green lights from the Court by increasing the tariffs he imposed on goods from
China and by directing U.S. companies to cease doing business in China.
Adler and Walker urge Congress to respond to the temporal problem created by broad congressional
grants of power by making greater use of sunset provisions in statutes that confer broad power on
agencies. In their view, including a sunset provision in a statute that grants broad power to an agency
would change congressional incentives in ways that would induce Congress to re-evaluate the powers
granted in such a statute and to revise them in ways that both update them and reduce the degree of
discretion the agency has to interpret the statute in ways that Congress did not intend. Congressional
actions of that type would address effectively both the political legitimacy and the temporal problems
1
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that are created by broad congressional grants of power to agencies. They refer to environmental
regulation and immigration as contexts in which it would be particularly desirable to give Congress the
incentive to re-evaluate and revise broad statutory grants of power by making them temporary.
I disagree with Adler and Walker on one important point. I do not believe that adding sunset provisions
to statutes that grant broad power to agencies would provide incentives sufficient to induce Congress to
reconsider and to revise those statutes. Congress lacks the institutional capability to take those actions.
In most circumstances, congressional impotence would create a situation in which broad grants of power
to agencies expire and are not replaced with any statute that fills the resulting void in federal power to
address important issues like air quality, climate change, immigration or regulation of the internet.
In section I of this response, I summarize the longstanding reasons why Congress has little choice but to
respond to a major problem by delegating broad power to an agency to address the problem. I then
describe some of the examples of the costly mistakes that Congress has made when it decided not to
confer broad power on an agency but instead to address a regulatory problem by making important
decisions itself. In part II, I describe the changes in the political environment that have created the state
of near complete congressional impotence that exists today and suggest ways in which we might be able
to change the incentives of members of Congress to restore some ability to legislate. In section III, I suggest
ways in which courts might be able to reduce the political legitimacy and temporal problems that are
created by broad congressional delegations of power to the executive branch.
Introduction
In Delegation and Time,2 Jonathan Adler and Chris Walker do an excellent job of introducing us to an
important new way of thinking about broad congressional delegations of power. After reviewing the
traditional arguments against broad congressional delegations of power rooted in concerns about lack of
political accountability they note that broad delegations increasingly raise a serious temporal problem.
In their words, “broad congressional delegations of authority at one time period become a source of
authority for agencies to take action at a later time that was wholly unanticipated by the enacting
Congress or could no longer receive legislative support.”3 They also note that this temporal problem “has
taken on added significance in the current era of congressional inaction.”4 Adler and Walker illustrate this
temporal problem well by referring to the efforts of the Federal Communications Commission to use the
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the internet and the efforts of the Environmental Protection
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Administration to use the Clean Air Act of 1972 to mitigate climate change.5 Neither statute was enacted
with those applications in mind and neither is well-suited to the task.
I agree completely with the concerns that Adler and Walker express. I would expand them to include
broad congressional delegations of power to the president that are being applied in ways that Congress
never contemplated and would not support today. President Trump’s use of the broad authority granted
the president in the Trade Expansion Act of 19626 and his use of the broad authority granted the president
under the National Emergencies Act of 19767 and over one hundred other “emergency” statutes illustrate
Adler and Walker’s temporal concerns particularly well.
President Trump has relied on the Trade Expansion Act as the basis for his imposition of massive tariffs as
part of his trade war against many of our trading partners.8 He has relied on the Emergencies Act to
reallocate funds from other uses to construction of the border wall that Congress has consistently refused
to fund.9 Both of those congressional grants of power have no apparent limit.
The Supreme Court recently rejected challenges to the validity of President Trump’s use of both of those
powers.10 Immediately after the Court refused to consider a challenge to the president’s use of the
Emergencies Act to fund the border wall, one of the Democratic candidates for president announced that,
if elected, he would invoke the Emergencies Act as the basis for spending trillions of dollars and imposing
draconian limits on the use of cars and trucks in an effort to mitigate climate change.11 President Trump
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responded to the apparent green lights from the Court by increasing the tariffs he imposed on goods from
China and directing U.S. companies to cease doing business in China.12
Adler and Walker urge Congress to respond to the temporal problem created by broad congressional
grants of power by making greater use of sunset provisions in statutes that confer broad power on
agencies.13 In their view, including a sunset provision in a statute that grants broad power to an agency
would change congressional incentives in ways that would induce Congress to re-evaluate the powers
granted in such a statute and to revise them in ways that both update them and reduce the degree of
discretion the agency has to interpret the statute in ways that Congress did not intend. Congressional
actions of that type would address effectively both the political legitimacy and the temporal problems
that are created by broad congressional grants of power to agencies. They refer to environmental
regulation and immigration as contexts in which it would be particularly desirable to give Congress the
incentive to re-evaluate and revise broad statutory grants of power by making them temporary.14
I agree with Adler and Walker on two points. First, it is important to change the incentives of members of
Congress to encourage them to legislate. Second, it would be desirable if we could devise ways of changing
those incentives to the extent required to induce Congress to reconsider and to revise periodically broad
grants of power to agencies.
I disagree with them on one important point. I do not believe that adding sunset provisions to statutes
that grant broad power to agencies would provide incentives sufficient to induce Congress to reconsider
and to revise those statutes. Congress lacks the institutional capability to take those actions. In most
circumstances, congressional impotence would create a situation in which broad grants of power to

12
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agencies expire and are not replaced with any statute that fills the resulting void in federal power to
address important issues like air quality, climate change, immigration or regulation of the internet.
In section I of this response, I summarize the longstanding reasons why Congress has little choice but to
respond to a major problem by delegating broad power to an agency to address the problem. I then
describe some of the examples of the costly mistakes that Congress has made when it decided not to
confer broad power on an agency but instead to address a regulatory problem by making important
decisions itself. In part II, I describe the changes in the political environment that have created the state
of near complete congressional impotence that exists today and suggest ways in which we might be able
to change the incentives of members of Congress to restore some ability to legislate. In section III, I suggest
ways in which courts might be able to reduce the political legitimacy and temporal problems that are
created by broad congressional delegations of power to the executive branch.
I. Reasons Why Congress Delegates Broad Power
Congress began to delegate power broadly to agencies in 1789 and it has done so on countless occasions
since then.15 The reasons are well known. Congress lacks the expertise, foresight and time required to
address effectively and intelligently problems like air quality and regulation of the internet.16
Regulation of air quality provides a good illustration of the problem. Some institution must make scores
of decisions about the permissible level of emissions and ambient concentrations of numerous sources of
pollutants. That institution must have a good understanding of the effects of various pollutants and of the
cost of potentially available emission control methodologies. Moreover, the standards and criteria must
be changed regularly to reflect changes in technology and in our understanding of the adverse effects of

15

For a summary of the history of broad delegations of power to agencies, see Kristin E. Hickman & Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., I Administrative Law Treatise §1.4 (6th ed. 2019).
16
For a description of the reasons why Congress delegates power broadly see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A.
Shapiro & Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process 32-46 (6th ed. 2016).
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pollutants at varying concentration levels. Congress lacks the expertise and time required to make those
decisions.
The political science literature adds another reason why Congress cannot make many of the decisions that
it delegates to agencies. Ken Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize for explaining why many important
decisions cannot be made by majority vote.17 In the common situation in which there are three or more
possible outcomes of a policy debate and none of the three has the support of a majority, Arrow proved
that it is impossible to resolve the debate through a process of majority voting. In that common situation,
it seems sensible to delegate decision making to an agency that has the expertise relevant to the decision
and some degree of political legitimacy attributable to its relationship with the elected president.
The alternative to congressional delegation of broad power to an agency is direct congressional resolution
of a policy debate through enactment of a statute that contains clear and explicit commands. On the rare
occasions when Congress has chosen that route it has made a mess of the situation. A few examples
illustrate the inability of Congress to choose resolutions of policy disputes that are sensible and durable.
The Food Stamp Act. In 1971 Congress amended the Food Stamp Act in an effort to eliminate abuse of
the food stamp program by affluent college students.18 The amendment required the Department of
Agriculture to deny food stamps to any household that includes anyone who was claimed as a dependent
on a tax return that reported income above a disqualifying level. The amendment had the unfortunate
effect of rendering ineligible for food stamps a woman who had a monthly income of $57.50 to support
twelve minor dependents because her former husband had declared two of those dependents on his
return. When confronted with this clearly unfair effect, the Supreme Court held the amendment to be

17

Arrow explained his famous impossibility theorem in detail in Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
Values (1951).
18
The Supreme Court described the amendment and its effects in the opinion in which it held the amendment
unconstitutional. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
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unconstitutional through application of the since discredited and abandoned irrebuttable presumption
doctrine.
The Delaney Clause. In 1958 Congress amended the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act in a way that was
intended to reduce the risk of getting cancer as a result of ingesting processed food that includes a
carcinogen.19 The amendment—often called the Delaney Clause--prohibited the Food and Drug
Administration from approving any pesticide that remains in a processed food if the pesticide “is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.” The Delaney Clause seemed to make sense in 1958 when
only relatively large quantities of pesticide residue could be detected in processed food and when the
only four known causes of cancer in animals also caused cancer in humans.
By 1988 the Delaney Clause had become nonsensical and counterproductive. By then we had developed
the ability to detect pesticide residues in processed food in submicroscopic quantities.20 We also knew
that the vast majority of substances that induce cancer in animals in laboratory tests in which animals are
force-fed massive quantities of a substance pose no risk of inducing cancer in humans when they are
ingested in the quantities in which they are found in the form of pesticide residues in processed food.21
FDA created a de minimus exception to the Delaney Clause on the basis of solid evidence that it was
harming public health.22 The Ninth Circuit rejected the de minimus exception on the basis that it was
inconsistent with the statute.23 The Delaney Clause is still in the statute but FDA has been able to avoid its
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The Delaney Clause and its unfortunate effects are described in Charles H. Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical
Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1084 (1974), and
Richard Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator’s Guide to the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 171 (1978).
20
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 496-97 (1989).
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Science 970 (1990).
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adverse effects on public health by tricking Congress into amending the statute in a way that makes it
impossible for the Clause to apply to any pesticide.24
The Natural Gas Policy Act. In 1978 Congress decided that the delegation of power to the Federal Power
Commission in the Natural Gas Act of 1938 to set “just and reasonable” prices for natural gas was unduly
broad. In the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) Congress replaced that broad standard with a specific list of
permissible prices applicable to a dozen categories of gas. NGPA interacted with market forces to create
a combination of bizarre and destructive effects that included a severe gas shortage followed by a massive
surplus and a range of prices that varied from 45 cents per MMBTU to 9 dollars per MMBTU.25
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act. In 1978, Congress made another ill-fated attempt to make
regulatory policy decisions itself. In the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA) Congress required
all electric utility and industrial consumers of natural gas who could use coal or oil to convert from natural
gas to oil or coal.26 The statute was based on the belief that the nation was experiencing a chronic shortage
of natural gas. Shortly after the statute was enacted the gas shortage turned into a massive surplus and
was replaced by a shortage of oil. About the same time, studies found that use of coal was causing
thousands of unnecessary deaths a year. It is hard to imagine a worse mismatch between a policy problem
and a regulatory response than the congressional decision to enact PIFUA.
I could add many more examples of bad regulatory policy decisions that Congress has made. I am not
aware of any counter-examples of policy decisions that Congress mandated in statutes that have proven
to be wise and far-sighted solutions to regulatory problems.

24

Kristin E. Hickman & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Federal Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 90-91 (2d ed. 2014).
For descriptions of the NGPA and its effects, see Richard Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and
Competition in Natural Gas Industry, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1983); Richard Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation,
Deregulation and Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 63 (1982).
26
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II. The Modern Congress Has No Capacity to Legislate
The success of the proposal to add sunset provisions to statutes that confer broad authority on agencies
depends critically on the ability of Congress to engage in the process of careful re-evaluation of statutes
as they approach their sunset date and to enact revised statutes that are more reflective of modern
understandings and values. I am not sure it was ever realistic to expect Congress to behave in that manner.
I am certain that Congress lacks that capacity today.
The U.S. system of separation of powers, coupled with the procedures required to enact legislation and
the Senate cloture rules, have always made it far more difficult for the U.S. Congress to enact legislation
than it is for the vast majority of legislative bodies in other countries to enact legislation. Article I requires
the House, the Senate and the President to agree on any piece of legislation, plus the cloture rules in the
Senate require 60 votes to end debate and allow a vote on a Bill. As a result Congress can legislate only
on a bipartisan basis. Legislators of both parties must be willing to compromise in order to enact
legislation.
Increased political polarity has combined with our methods of choosing candidates for office and leaders
of the House and Senate to decrease dramatically the capacity of Congress to legislate. There is broad
agreement among scholars that our system of government has developed a major imbalance in the form
of a transfer of undue power from the legislative branch to the executive branch.27 The power of the
executive has increased dramatically because of the growing impotence of the legislative branch.28
Congress is capable of legislating only during the brief periods in which one political party controls the
House, the Senate and the Presidency. Even then the proponent of legislation must find a route around
27

E.g., Jerry Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of
Recent American Experience, 35 Yale J. on Reg. 549 (2018); Dan Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World
of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 137 (2014); Peter Strauss, Overseer or the Decider? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).
28
How to Measure a Dysfunctional, Gridlocked Congress, FIXGOV (June 28, 2016); Fred Dews, 3 Charts that
Capture the Rise in Congressional Gridlock, Brookings Now (May 30, 2014).

9

the cloture rules if the proponent’s party has less than sixty members of the Senate. During all other
periods of time legislative gridlock prevails and precludes Congress from enacting any meaningful
legislation except on a short- term emergency basis. Congressional impotence creates a void that can only
be filled by the executive branch.
Congressional impotence is primarily a function of extreme and growing political polarity.29 Historians and
political scientists have devoted a lot of time and energy to efforts to understand the complicated roots
of that phenomenon. They have helped us understand why we have become so polarized but they have
not yet identified any promising steps we can take to limit the increase in the political polarity of the
electorate. That leaves us only with the option of trying to identify changes in our political institutions
that have the potential to reduce the adverse effects of political polarity.
Without major changes in the composition of our political institutions, the incentives of the members of
Congress, and the voting rules of Congress, we will experience increasing adverse effects of the failure of
our version of Democracy. As statutes become increasingly obsolete, the executive branch will have no
choice but to try to stretch the power Congress has delegated to it in ways that put increased stress on
the third branch—the judiciary. It is hard to see how judges can play constructive roles when they are
regularly forced to choose between allowing the executive branch to exceed the boundaries of its
delegated power and creating a situation in which no institution of government is capable of responding
to the constantly changing needs of the nation.
There is also broad agreement that the president has increased his personal political power to an
undesirable degree.30 Traditionally many important executive branch decisions were made by agency
heads who were nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as officers of the United States

29

Darrell M. West, Divided Politics, Divided Nation (2019); Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 Yale. L. J. 804 (2016).
30
E.g., Mashaw & Berke, supra. note ___; Strauss, supra. note ___.
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because of their expertise in the areas in which they made decisions. Over time that system of executive
branch decision making has been replaced by a system in which many decisions are made by anonymous
white house political operatives who have no subject matter expertise and are motivated solely by their
desire to aid the president and his supporters.31 If left unchecked, increasing political polarity will
accelerate the trend to replace the power of agencies headed by officers of the United States with the
personal power of the president and anonymous white house aides.
The stakes are high. We must identify ways of encouraging legislators to engage in the kinds of
compromises with each other and with the president that are essential to their ability to legislate. The
starting point should be the process of nominating candidates for office. Our present method of choosing
candidates yields candidates who are not representative of the views of a majority of the members of
either political party, at the same time that it discourages legislators from entering into the bipartisan
negotiations that are essential to the compromises that can lead to legislation.32
Primaries are low turnout elections.33 The few voters who choose to participate are the most ideologically
extreme members of the party.34 As a result Democratic primaries select the candidates who are furthest
to the left and Republican primaries select the candidates who are furthest to the right. Primaries create
a legislative body that is more polarized than the electorate. That greatly reduces the likelihood that the
members of the House and Senate can reach agreement on a compromise.
The primary process also greatly discourages members from compromising or even attempting to
compromise. The vast majority of members represent districts or states that are “safe” in the sense that

31

Charles Clark, Vacancy Rate for Top Agency Jobs Continues to Set Records, Government Executive (Aug. 1, 2018);
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Staffing Federal Agencies: Lessons from 1981-2016, Brookings Center on Regulation &
Markets (Apr. 27, 2017); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster
Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 Duke L. J. 1645 (2015).
32
Richard Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Cal. L.
Rev. 273, 284 (2011).
33
Id. at 298-99.
34
Id. at 298-99.
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the candidate chosen by the member’s party is virtually certain to win the general election.35 The only
threat to a Senator in a “safe” state or a Congressman in a “safe” district arises as a result of the primary
process. If the member compromises or threatens to compromise by moving to the center, she is virtually
certain to face a primary challenger who has an excellent chance of defeating the member by running to
her left if she is a Democrat or to her right if she is a Republican. The risk of being “primaried” is the only
realistic risk that a representative of a “safe” state or district confronts. She knows that risk increases if
she moves toward the center to compromise, so her only safe course of action is to avoid all compromises
and to take positions that are on the left end of the ideological spectrum if she is a Democrat and on the
right end of the ideological spectrum if she is a Republican.36
The alternative to party primaries are the methods that both political parties used in the U.S. until the
1970s and that most of the world’s other Democracies use to choose candidates for office.37 The leaders
of the party choose the candidates based on a combination of a correspondence between the potential
candidate’s values and the values of the party and an evaluation of the probability that the potential
candidate will win the general election. Rick Pildes refers to these traditional methods of choosing
candidates as peer-based.38 Since the dominant views of the electorate that participates in the general
election are invariably near the right end of ideological spectrum of the members of the Democratic Party
and near the left end of the spectrum of the members of the Republican Party, the party leaders have a
powerful incentive to nominate centrists. The candidates who win the general election then have an

35

Inside elections.com (2016); Stacey Hunt & David Schultz, Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter
(2015).
36
Richard Pierce, Finding a Path Back to Democratic Governance, Regulatory Review (Feb. 26, 2018).
37
There are many good descriptions and analyses of the changes in the nomination process the U.S. made in the
1970s. E.g., Aram Goudsouzian, The Men and the Moment (2019);Stephen Gardbaum & Richard Pildes, Populism
and Institutional Design: Methods for Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 647 (2018); Elaine
Kamarck, Returning Peer Review to the American Presidential Nominating Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 709 (2018);
Elaine Kamarck, Primary Politics (3d ed. 2018); Pildes, supra. note __ at 287-315.
38
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incentive to take centrist positions on issues and to compromise with the members of the opposing party
so that they can claim success in the legislative process. A House and Senate whose members are
nominated through use of a peer-based method are far more likely to be able to make the bipartisan
compromises that are essential to the process of enacting legislation.
The second essential step we must take to create conditions in which Congress can enact legislation is to
change the rules of the House and Senate that determine who controls the agenda in each. Elimination of
the “Hastert rule” is almost as important to our ability to function as a Democracy as elimination of party
primaries. The Hastert rule prohibits the Speaker of the House from bringing any Bill to the floor for a vote
unless a majority of the members of the Speaker’s caucus support the Bill.39 The Hastert rule has the effect
of giving a minority of the members of the House the power to veto any Bill even if it would get a favorable
vote from a majority of the members if it could make it to the floor for a vote. The majority of the members
of the caucus (and minority of the members of the House) who have this veto power are always the most
far right members of the Republican caucus or the most far left members of the Democratic caucus.
Elimination of the Hastert rule would be effective only if it is coupled with a new method of selecting the
Speaker of the House. Bill Galston and the Problem Solvers Caucus of House Members that he advises
have proposed a rule that would require a candidate for Speaker to obtain a two-thirds majority of the
members of the House to be elected.40 That change in the composition of the electorate required to elect
the Speaker would create an environment in which the Speaker is likely to be a centrist. The Speaker
would then have a completely different set of incentives to determine the agenda of the House by

39

For discussion of the rule and its effects see Sarah Binder, Are the Days of the Hastert Rule Numbered? Some
Caution in Reading the House, Brookings Op-Ed (Mar. 1, 2013).
40
Carl Hulse, Can the House Speakership Be Saved, These Lawmakers Have an Idea, New York Times (June 16,
2018); Tom Davis, How to Fix Washington, Step One, The Hill (Mar. 1, 2018); William Galston, To Fix the House,
Start with the Speaker, Wall Street Journal (Feb. 27, 2018).
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allowing floor votes on Bills that have strong bipartisan support even if they are opposed by a majority of
the members of the Speaker’s party.
It is equally important to change the rules governing the process of choosing the person who controls the
agenda-setting process in the Senate. At present, the majority leader controls the agenda-setting process.
He regularly uses that control to preclude the Senate from voting on Bills that would be enacted by a
majority if they were the subject of a vote if the Bill is opposed by a majority of Senators who are members
of his party. Thus, for instance, a Bill that would be enacted by a vote of 70 to 30 cannot be the subject of
a vote if the 30 opponents are members of the majority leader’s party.
We must adopt a change in the Senate rules that increases the likelihood that Bills that have the support
of a majority of Senators will be the subject of a vote. A change analogous to the change urged by the
Problem Solvers caucus in the House would work.41 The person who controls the agenda in the Senate
should be chosen through a process that requires a two-thirds majority of the members of the Senate.
The combination of the primary process and the present methods of electing the people who control the
agenda-setting process in the House and Senate produces a situation in which a minority of a minority
can veto any Bill. The minority with the veto power lies on the far right fringe of the Republican Party and
the far left fringe of the Democratic Party. If we replace the primary process with a peer-based system of
choosing candidates for office and we change the rules of the House and Senate applicable to the selection
of the person who controls the agenda-setting process, we will return to an institutional environment in
which the members of both the House and the Senate are more representative of the views of a majority
of the electorate and in which they are far more likely to be able to perform the critical task of enacting
legislation.

41

See text supra. at notes 39-40.
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Without major changes in our methods of choosing candidates for office and choosing the people who
control the agenda-setting process in the House and Senate, there is no reason to believe that the Adler/
Walker proposal would produce the careful periodic re-evaluation and re-enactment in revised form that
is critical to the success of their proposal. I am not confident that Congress could and would perform that
task even if the political parties make the radical changes I propose. The best illustration of the difficulty
of the task is our experience with the Congressional Review Act (CRA).
Congress enacted the CRA in 1996 in an attempt to create an easy means through which Congress can
veto any agency rule that it dislikes.42 The CRA relies on the same set of tools that Adler and Walker
propose to make it easy for Congress to implement the process of re-evaluation and reenactment of a
statute that is about to expire. The House and Senate are required to give priority to any resolution to
veto a rule; amendments are prohibited; floor debate is limited; and the usual requirement of sixty votes
for cloture in the Senate does not apply.
Yet with all of those mechanisms in place to expedite the process of vetoing a rule, the CRA was used only
once between 1996 and 2017. There are only two potential explanations for the lack of use of the CRA for
over twenty years. Either no agency issued a rule that Congress disliked for over twenty years, or even
with access to mandatory expedited procedures it was virtually impossible for Congress to take any
legislative action to veto a rule it disliked. Only the second potential explanation seems plausible. That
suggests strongly that Congress would find it impossible to re-enact an expired regulatory statute in a new
and improved form.
In 2017, Congress used the CRA to veto fifteen agency rules. Those actions were not the product of careful
evaluation of the hundreds of rules that were eligible for veto in 2017, however. When Dan Farber
compared the handful of rules that were vetoed with the many rules that were eligible for veto but were
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not vetoed, he was unable to identify any principle that could explain why a few rules were vetoed and
most were not. 43 The vetoed rules were not particularly important, and their ratio of costs to benefits did
not differ from those of the rules that were not vetoed. This suggests that the decisions were based solely
on complaints from a few politically powerful interest groups that disliked a handful of rules. There is no
evidence that Congress engaged in the kind of careful evaluation process that Adler and Walker imagine
as the basis for a congressional decision to re-enact an expired statute in an improved form.
Thus, while I agree with Adler and Walker that broad congressional delegations of power to agencies (or
to the president) create a growing temporal problem that compounds the political legitimacy problem
they create I reject their proposed solution as beyond the capacity of Congress.
III. What Can Courts Do to Address the Problem?
Having acknowledged a serious problem and rejected one proposed solution I owe readers an alternative
solution. I suggest a combination of continuation of four changes in judicial review that are already in
progress: continuation and extension of the canonical approach to statutory interpretation that Cass
Sunstein has documented, reduced deference to agency interpretations of statutes, increased vigor in
applying the arbitrary and capricious test, and continued judicial receptivity to arguments that some
statutes are unconstitutional because they violate the non-delegation doctrine.
In a recent article, Cass Sunstein argued persuasively that the Court is already in the process of enforcing
the non-delegation doctrine by adopting canons of construction that narrow agency discretion to exercise
power when they rely on unduly broad delegations of power.44 He used the opinions in Michigan v. EPA45
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to make his point. All nine Justices agreed that EPA cannot issue a rule without considering cost unless
Congress explicitly precludes EPA from considering cost.
The Gundy case that evoked multiple opinions from a badly divided court in 2019 was another good
candidate for resolution through invocation of a canon of construction.46 The question before the Court
was whether the decision of Congress to leave to the discretion of the Attorney General the question of
whether to apply the SORNA sex offender registration system retroactively violated the non-delegation
doctrine. The Court could (and should) have resolved the case by invoking the canon that retroactive
application of statutes is disfavored. The majority chose instead to resolve the case by attributing to
Congress an intent to require the Attorney General to apply the registration system as early as feasible.
Numerous Supreme Court opinions issued over the last decade illustrate the Court’s increasing tendency
to confer less deference on agency interpretations of statutes.47 The temporal problem that Adler and
Walker identify provides another good reason for the Court to continue to move in that direction. A court
should not uphold an agency action unless the court is convinced that Congress has authorized the action.
Recent Supreme Court opinions also suggest that the Court is increasingly willing to use a hard look
approach to agency decision making when it applies the arbitrary and capricious test.48 The problem that
Adler and Walker identify supports a continuation and expansion of that effort. If an agency is justifying
its action by relying on an old statute that confers broad power on the agency, it should be required to
explain the basis for its action in detail.
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Finally, the Court should continue to be receptive to arguments that some statutes are worded so broadly
that they violate the non-delegation doctrine. The views expressed by the Justices in Gundy in 2019
suggest that the Court is increasingly receptive to such arguments.49 Three Justices joined a dissenting
opinion in which they expressed the view that SORNA was unconstitutional as a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. A fourth Justice wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he indicated his
willingness to participate in an effort to reinvigorate the non-delegation doctrine in the future. A fifth
Justice did not participate, but it is fair to infer from his opinions in other cases that he too is open to
arguments that some statutes contain standardless delegations of so much power that they violate the
non-delegation doctrine.
The serious problem that Adler and Walker identify supports the open-minded attitude toward
reinvigoration of the non-delegation doctrine that is evidenced by the opinions in Gundy, particularly if
the Court chooses the canonical remedy urged by Sunstein rather than the more draconian remedy of
invalidation of the statute.
I end where I began. Even though I oppose the remedy Adler and Walker propose for the temporal
problem created by broad delegations of power to agencies in old statutes, I applaud their successful
effort to identify and to document the problem.
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